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Abstract
We make some introductory remarks to set the stage for the present
issue on Robert Meyer’s program of relevant arithmetic.
1 Introduction
Over the decades of Bob Meyer’s prodigious career as philosopher and lo-
gician, a topic to which he reliably—if intermittently—returned is relevant
arithmetic. Fragmented across a series of abstracts, technical reports, and
journal articles Meyer outlined a research program in nonclassical mathemat-
ics that rivals that of the intuitionists in its maturity, depth, and perspicacity.
The inaccessibility of the program’s two foundational texts, however, has
served as an artificial barrier to the circulation of Meyer’s ideas. These
1976 monographs—Arithmetic Formulated Relevantly and The Consistency
of Arithmetic—in which the program and core arguments saw their definitive
expression remained unpublished. Meyer distributed copies of these works
but the scope of this distribution was extremely limited, severely restricting
the reach of Meyer’s program. The project did not necessarily languish in the
vacuum left by these monographs—Meyer continued to develop and promote
the program in papers and talks—but the pronounced inaccessibility of its
cornerstone documents no doubt hindered its flourishing. And, as the reader
will soon discover, between the novelty of Meyer’s insights into the relation-
ship between logic and mathematics and the humor and wit with which he
delivers those insights, this has inarguably been a loss.
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This special issue of the Australasian Journal of Logic has been produced
in an effort to correct this unfortunate state of affairs. Many hands have
played a role in the production of this issue and among these contributors,
it seems universally accepted that Meyer’s project of relevant arithmetic still
has a great deal to offer.
The centerpiece of this special issue the publication of corrected editions
incorporating the most complete texts of Arithmetic Formulated Relevantly
and The Consistency of Arithmetic available. While fragmented copies of the
monographs have been in limited circulation, time and imperfect reproduc-
tion methods have significantly degraded their legibility, risking the loss of
what remains. The present publication in a digital format will preserve their
content for years to come, making the work available to anyone interested,
irrespective of their geography, resources, or affiliation.
To place the monographs in context, we are presenting them alongside
three additional texts on relevant arithmetic; these pieces complement the
monographs either by providing historical context or filling technical lacunae
(or at risk of being lost themselves). The presentation of Meyer’s unpublished
work is rounded out by a detailed bibliography of Meyer’s published output
on relevant arithmetic and a note from Chris Mortensen describing the gen-
esis of the joint 1984 paper “Inconsistent Models for Relevant Arithmetics”
[4].
Finally, we extended an invitation to contemporary researchers to ap-
praise Meyer’s program with a host of original, peer reviewed research papers
that collectively illustrate the potential and continued relevance of Meyer’s
work. From philosophical and formal evaluations of Meyer’s project to new
technical results, the breadth of the papers included in this issue is testament
to the continued relevance of Meyer’s work to current trends in logic.
2 Meyer’s Project
A relevant arithmetic is any formal theory in which number theory may be
expressed that is based on a relevant logic. Meyer touched on a number of
relevant arithmetics but his favored theory is R]—the closure of the Peano
axioms and induction schema under the relevant logic R.
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2.1 Why R]?
There is a range of possible entreaties one could make to motivate the study
of R] and its properties. We can characterize two modes of these appeals on
the basis of their apparent scope: the conservative and radical.
The conservative mode offers reasons to believe that as a model of math-
ematical practice R] is superior to classical PA. One way to demonstrate
this superiority would be to show that classical methods demand a sacrifice
in expressivity that collapses important distinctions in mathematical. The
logical vocabulary of the relevant logic R is sufficiently rich to distinguish the
material conditional (⊃) from the intensional notion of entailment (→).
Meyer’s description of the distinction between the two is:
The material ⊃ I take to be a fact-laden connective; it merely
transmutes simpler statements of fact into a more complex state-
ment of fact. As such, it neither rests on nor licenses any lawful
connections between the facts so compounded. But good argu-
ments, whether deductively general or inductively particular, rest
on connections, not facts.
The relevant→, as I see it, is introduced precisely to take account
of such connections. And this introduces, at the formal level, an
opportunity to make distinctions which, though perhaps dimly
present in the intuitive base, goes beyond it in sharpness and in
formal clarity.
In the classical setting, the material conditional is the closest proxy for rela-
tion of entailment, leading to a conflation between the two. Applications of
classical logic thus inherit this inability to distinguish between ⊃ and →.
Arguably, this limitation becomes especially apparent when formulating
arithmetic with the limited resources of classical logic. A (possibly fuzzy)
notion of entailment, after all, is a centerpiece of mathematics. Should it turn
out that mathematical practice frequently invokes a notion of entailment con-
ceptually distinct from ⊃, then to formulate arithmetic in a classical setting is
to rob from the mathematician the ability to express important distinctions.
An example that Meyer frequently deploys is an intuitive distinction be-
tween the sentences 0 = 2 ⊃ 0 = 1 and 0 = 2→ 0 = 1. (This is an example
that is touched upon by a number of the contributed papers in this issue.)
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[W]e should expect to find A ⊃ B provable on some number-
theoretic occasions when A → B is unprovable. And this hap-
pens. 0 = 2, being arithmetically false, materially implies every-
thing. But if we hypothetically overloaded arithmetic so as to
identify 0 and 2, it’s just gratuitous to suppose that we should
thereby have identified, say, 0 and 1. Indeed, when we take the
integers modulo 2, we do identify 0 and 2, without going on to
identify 0 and 1.
The conservative appeal proceeds by providing reasons to prefer R] over PA.
This mode of persuasion allows one to focus on R] itself, as success does not
require that one shows PA to be wrong.
In contrast, the radical mode goes further. In The Consistency of Arith-
metic, Meyer goes beyond the suggestion of R]’s superiority and states that
R] corrects a historical injustice triggered by incautious readings of Gödel’s
Second Theorem. In particular, Meyer is sympathetic to the Hilbert program
of proving the correctness of arithmetic through finitary methods.
R] has several intriguing properties that can be established through fini-
tary arguments. For one, it can be proven to be Post consistent by the
construction of finite models. For two, it can be shown to be arithmetically
consistent in the sense that no false arithmetical equations can be proven.
Between these two properties, Meyer argues that R] can be shown to be
correct in the sense proposed by Hilbert, thereby “overturning” Gödel and
restoring Hilbert.
Of course, this position is risky—talk of “repealing” Gödel’s Inconsis-
tency Theorems runs dangerously close to the theses expounded by “Cantor
cranks”—but Meyer bravely enters this minefield nevertheless. As the reader
will see, however, Meyer comes prepared; the arguments outlined in The Con-
sistency of Arithmetic are lucid and treat the subject of the correctness of
arithmetic with incredible subtlety and care. Even in the typescripts’ most
pugnacious moments—and there are many pugnacious moments—Meyer re-
fuses to cut corners.
2.2 The Friedman-Meyer Result
Given the laudatory tone of our description of Meyer’s results on R], the
reader may ask: Was the distribution of Meyer’s typescripts really so limited
as to deny the project the legacy it deserved? If finitary means suffice to show
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R] to be arithmetically correct, why is this a priori vindication of Hilbert
not more widely known? Surely, the publication of e.g. [2] and [4] made the
results, if not the entire context, available to the logic community, after all.
As Meyer described in [1]:
At first, all seemed promising. Ordinary theorems of classical
Peano arithmetic PA... were readily provable in R]. More or less
trivially, PA can be exactly translated into R]. But, unlike PA,
there are simple and effective proofs of the consistency of R] in
several interesting senses. Moreover, since intuitionist logic is also
translatable into R, many devices of constructive proof theory are
immediately available.[1, p. 824]
The turning point in the fortunes of R] was ultimately the inadmissibility of γ.
In the background of the monographs, Meyer acknowledges the importance
of showing that R] recovers all of number theory. One of the fundamental
assumptions at the heart of Meyer’s project is that mathematical practice
is in many ways prior to logic; if the number theorist finds that there are
theorems that fail in R], this would be a blow to the applicability of the
theory. Throughout the monographs, Meyer knows that Ackermann’s γ—
modus ponens for the material conditional—would be necessary to ensure
that the whole of classical number theory is recoverable in R].
But Meyer was unable to prove that γ is admissible in R]. In [1], Harvey
Friedman and Meyer published Friedman’s result producing a recognizably
true theorem of number theory that is not provable in R]. Because R] is
conservative over its negation-free subtheory R]+, Friedman and Meyer can
provide a necessary condition for the admissibility of γ, namely, that for an
extension P+ of R]+, every strictly positive theorem of PA is provable in P+.
By showing that the ring of complex numbers C is a model of P+, Friedman
and Meyer show that the Quadratic Residue Formula:
∀x∃y∀z∃a∃b(a(2x+ 1) + b(y − z2) = +1)
is a PA theorem not provable in P+.
It is not necessarily clear how damaging the Friedman-Meyer result should
be to R], much less for the project of formulating arthmetic relevantly in
general. Meyer left open avenues to explore. For one, Meyer continued
to establish interesting results about R] (see e.g. [3]), demonstrating that
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worthwhile investigations remained in the wake of the Friedman-Meyer result.
Additionally, Meyer showed that γ was admissible in R]]—R] enriched with
the infinitary ω-rule—entailing that PA is included in R]]. Secondly, if R] lacks
sufficient power to prove all number-theoretic truths—and R]]’s infinitary
nature makes it overly powerful—there remains the possibility of a “sweet
spot” R]1/2 in which γ is admissible yet is demonstrably Post consistent by
finitary means.
But the real question posed by our main result is the following:
Given that the straightforward approach of simply grafting the
first-order Peano postulates into R has failed, is there a relevant
way of thinking about the natural numbers which will produce a
more satisfactory result? Hence our question: Whither relevant
arithmetic?[1, p. 825]
This issue may not provide a definitive answer to the question with which
Meyer has left us. But by providing new resources for the study of R] and
contemporary thoughts on the project, it is our hope that we have moved
the needle in the direction of a satisfactory answer to the question.
3 This Issue
We’ll break up the description of this issue’s contents into three parts: The
corrected monographs on relevant arithmetic, the reprinted papers by Meyer
and Mortensen, and the pieces original to this issue.
3.1 Meyer’s Two Monographs on Relevant Arithmetic
Of the many papers collected in this issue, one of the clear highlights is the
appearance of Meyer’s previously unpublished monographs on R]: Arithmetic
Formulated Relevantly and The Consistency of Arithmetic. After exhaustive
efforts, we are confident that the copies included here represent as detailed
and complete a picture of Meyer’s typescripts as possible.
Although the two monographs are similar in scope—a philosophical and
mathematical investigation into R]—each is an independent, self-contained
work. Although it is inevitable that independent surveys of a formal subject
like R] should see some overlap, the relationship between the two is more
complicated than the duplication of necessary formal definition.
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We have remarked on two ways in which the study of R] can be motivated—
one conservative, the other radical. This division is reflected by the distinct
approaches taken by the two monographs. As illustration, consider Meyer’s
explicit goals for each work. In his own words, Arithmetic Formulated Rele-
vantly has the following aim:
The purpose of this paper is to formulate first-order Peano arith-
metic within the resources of relevant logic, and to demonstrate
certain properties of the system thus formulated.
The monograph serves as a vade mecum—an open invitation to the study of
R]—in which the reader is provided an overview of Meyer’s primary technical
results and provided with reasons to consider the system worth pursuing.
While the work includes some of Meyer’s hallmark poking fun of various idols
of mathematics and logic, the tone never becomes vitriolic. Rather, the tone
is good-humored and light, and the mode of argumentation is conservative
in the sense that we have suggested.
In contrast, The Consistency of Arithmetic is far more radical in its aims
and tone. Again, in Meyer’s words:
This paper offers an elementary proof that formal arithmetic is
consistent... repeal [ing] Gödel’s famous second theorem... Ac-
cordingly, this paper reinstates the formal program which is often
taken to have been blasted away by Gödel’s theorems—namely,
the Hilbert program.
While Arithmetic Formulated Relevantly is content to engage in good-humored
lampooning of what Meyer perceives to be the classical idols, The Consis-
tency of Arithmetic sets out to raze them entirely.
In conjunction, then, the two monographs form a unified whole presenting
a mature and accessible theory of arithmetic that is solid in its foundations
and far-reaching in its goals.
We must make a remark about the completeness of the texts. Unfortu-
nately, all copies of the two typescripts of which we are aware are incomplete;
in all cases, the text breaks off at a “fracture point” that clearly occurs prior
to typescript’s intended conclusion. Consequently, at least some elements
of the investigations promised in the respective introductions are victims of
the lacuna. Moreover, Meyer employs endnotes rather than footnotes and
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denotes bibliographical references with integers, guaranteeing that the texts’
marginalia and bibliographies are likewise counted as casualties. It seems
clear that the majority of the works’ text exists;1 judging by the outlines
that Meyer sketches in the typescripts’ introductions, the extant sections of
both typescripts appear to cover the lion’s share of the topics set out for dis-
cussion. Despite this reassurance—the fact remains that the reproductions
offered in this issue suffer from these gaps.
Cross-referencing against other copies of the typescripts shows a con-
stancy in the locations of the two respective “fracture points,” i.e., all copies
of Arithmetic Formulated Relevantly end at the same passage. This sug-
gests that the copies of each of the two works share an ancestral typescript
that itself was incomplete, making it likely that the present reproductions of
Meyer’s two works provide as complete a realization as possible.
While little besides the topic of Meyer’s footnotes can be recovered from
the the text, the identity of many of the works cited by Meyer can be inferred
by textual clues. We have made an effort to reconstruct as much of the works’
respective bibliographies as could be reasonably inferred from the text.
3.2 Selections from Meyer’s Papers
Some efforts at preserving documents stem from an archaeological impulse,
according to which saving obscure historical artifacts from degradation is
a good in itself. The motivation driving the effort to prepare and publish
Meyer’s monographs, however, goes beyond this. Nearly half a century after
their writing, the content of Meyer’s two monographs remains as powerful and
compelling as ever. Meyer’s arguments and insights concerning R] continue
to be relevant to the philosophies of logic and mathematics; they deserve not
merely to be preserved but to be debated and grappled with. In short, our
goal is to help make Meyer’s work on R] actionable.
This goal requires that the typescripts are provided with sufficient context
to ensure that researchers not familiar with the esoterica of relevant logic may
still benefit. To this end, the monographs in this issue are coomplemented
1There is some uncertainty with respect to whether the works were indeed completed.
No source of the extant texts has suggested having seen copies that were in fact complete,
suggesting that Meyer never finished either work. On the other hand, gaps in the bibli-
ographies suggest the existence of a more complete work. E.g., the text of The Consistency
of Arithmetic includes citations to items [1], [2], [3], [5], and [7]; were items [4] and [6]
part of a planned bibliography, or were they cited in sections that are now lost?
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by three reprinted papers by Meyer and Chris Mortensen:
• Relevant Arithmetic
− Robert K. Meyer
Meyer’s extended abstract, published in the Bulletin of the Section of Logic in
1976, acts as a frontispiece to the entire issue. The work is essentially a précis
of the two unpublished monographs, offering Meyer a venue to announce
his formal results on R] alongside the philosophical conclusions he draws
therefrom. Although the monographs themselves included no abstracts, the
approachable sketch of the program given by Meyer in this work provides the
needed orientation, preparing the reader for the monographs that follow.
• Inconsistent Models for Relevant Arithmetics
− Robert K. Meyer and Chris Mortensen
Meyer’s unpublished typescripts (or, at least, the extant copies thereof) share
an unfortunate—arguably, catastrophic—feature. The most important the-
ses of the monographs rest on the Post consistency of R]. That R] has this
property is indispensable to the integrity of the work—indeed, this feature
constitutes one typescript’s very title. Yet although each advertises a proof
of this property, neither work includes that proof. This 1984 paper is the first
appearance of the proof. Not only does its inclusion complement Meyer’s
typescripts by making good on their promises, it has broader dividends for
the issue as a whole. Meyer and Mortensen’s general technique of establish-
ing Post consistency by appeal to a finite, inconsistent model has become a
standard tool in paraconsistent mathematics, one that is employed in several
of the contributed research papers as well.
• Alien Intruders in Relevant Arithmetic
− Robert K. Meyer and Chris Mortensen
Meyer and Mortensen’s 1987 ANU technical report is a detailed study of the
rich and surprising model theory of nonstandard integers in R], culminating
in the description of a rational model of R], i.e., a model extending Q in
which the model views each rational as a positive integer. In contrast to the
foregoing pieces—each of which shore up some deficiency in the monographs’
text—the inclusion of this piece is less clear-cut. Its appearance undoubt-
edly enhances the monographs in demonstrating the rich possibilities for the
study of R]. Other work on R] could have played a similar role. Instead,
the work stands out for sharing with the monographs a nearly total inac-
Australasian Journal of Logic (18:5) 2021, Article no. 1
141
cessibility remedied by its inclusion in this issue. The negligible scale of its
publication—no library known to WorldCat holds a copy—guaranteed that
the work has been as inaccessible as Meyer’s unpublished monographs.
3.3 Original Contributions
When planning this project, we thought that looking forward to future di-
rections for Meyer’s project was as important as the backward-facing project
of preserving the work. In this issue, Meyer’s own work is complemented by
a collection of research papers original to this issue.
First, Chris Mortensen shared a short piece that provides additional con-
text for the genesis of his joint work with Meyer:
• A Remark on Relevant Arithmetic
− Chris Mortensen
This is a short piece in which Mortensen recounts facts about the process
and deliberations between himself and Meyer that would lead to the 1984
“Inconsistent Models for Relevant Arithmetics.”
Additionally, this issue includes a series of peer-reviewed research papers that
collectively illustrate a number of directions in which future research on R]
can be taken.
• Episodes in Model-Theoretic Xenology: Rationals as Positive
Integers in R]2
− Thomas Macaulay Ferguson and Elisángela Ramı́rez-Cámara
This paper applies the model-theoretic tool of ultraproducts to the ratio-
nal models of R] described by Meyer and Mortensen in their 1987 technical
report. Defining rational models as ultraproducts allows a view into their
structure with a level of detail not available in the original formulation. It is
shown how the approach serves to demystify several of the rational models’
counterintuitive features—like a Lagrangian four-square representation of a
negative integer—by showing how they naturally arise from the definition of
an ultraproduct’s elements.
2We note that Thomas Ferguson recused himself from any editorial responsibilities
bearing on this contribution. With respect to this article—to include its refereeing and
decision—Graham Priest served as the sole editor.
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• The Formalization of Arithmetic in a Logic of Meaning Contain-
ment
− Ross T. Brady
Whereas Meyer uses a strong relevant logic to formulate arithmetic, Ross
Brady has championed an alternative arithmetic MC] based on a weaker rel-
evant logic than R. In this paper, Brady critiques several aspects of Meyer’s
approach to relevant arithmetic and provides an interesting contrast by out-
lining the strengths his own project. As a positive result, Brady strengthens
his earlier results on encoding primitive recursion in MC], showing that gen-
eral recursion can be consistently represented as well.
• On Consistency and Decidability in Some Paraconsistent Arith-
metics
− Andrew Tedder
We have remarked that one of the enduring legacies of Meyer and Mortensen’s
1984 paper is the utility of inconsistent, finite models in the study of paracon-
sistent arithmetic. Tedder’s contribution is a perfect example of the versatil-
ity of the technique. Tedder considers several arithmetic theories yielded by
evaluating two weak axiomatizations of arithmetic against several paraconsis-
tent logics (including the system RM3), establishing a number of interesting
results—and proposing a number of alluring conjectures—considering their
complexity and decidability.
• “A Smack of Irrelevance” in Inconsistent Mathematics?
− Luis Estrada-González and Manuel Eduardo Tapia-Navarro
The relevance of the subformulae of a sentence j = k → m = m to one
another is not immediately recognizable in case m is distinct from j and k;
however, all such sentences are provable in R]. Estrada-González and Tapia-
Navarro focus their contribution on this and analogous cases in which the
relevance of a conditional is questionable. Several positions on this question
are carefully evaluated in the contexts of arithmetic and set theory. The
authors suggest that the standard notions of relevance in the literature are too
coarse to adequately cover such cases and give a lucid account of the factors
bearing on the adequacy of notion and the stakes involved, before proposing
a new criterion—q-relevance—that improves upon the stock formalizations
of relevance.
• On Not Saying What We Shouldn’t Have To Say
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− Shay Logan and Graham Leach-Krouse
This piece takes as a starting point Meyer’s remarks on guaranteeing the dis-
tinctness of two distinct numbers’ successors by means of an axiom, namely,
that one shouldn’t “have to say” that this holds. There are, after all, prearith-
metical intuitions about numerals that already provide sufficient grounds for
the thought represented by the axiom. Logan and Leach-Krouse respond by
providing a formalization of intuitions about the identity between syntactic
terms by primitive recursive methods and show that the formal system in-
deed captures important prearithmetical intuitions about the distinctness of
successors. Among the many points of intersection with Meyer’s project are
lessons to be drawn about relevance between equations and frameworks for
exploring the space of arithmetics between R] and R]].
• Relevant Arithmetic and Mathematical Pluralism
− Zach Weber
Weber appraises Meyer’s project of relevant arithmetic from twin perspec-
tives: a pluralist perspective, in which R] is just a different arithmetic than
PA, and a monist perspective, in which there exists a “true” account of
arithmetic which may or may not coincide with R] (or R]]). Importantly,
not only are Meyer’s positive remarks considered, but also the import of the
Friedman-Meyer result of the inadmissibility of γ. Of special interest over the
course of this paper are reexaminations of the proofs of two critical results
about γ: its inadmissibility in R] and its admissibility in R]], with an eye to
whether the arguments can work in a relevant metatheory.
4 Administrivia
We conclude by tending to the various items of administrivia that accompany
such a issue. Happily, nearly all such matters are acknowledgments.
The core objective of this issue is widening the reach and availability of
Meyer’s work on R]; success or failure of this goal is inextricably tied to
the quality of the vehicle of its distribution. Releasing the issue with the
Australasian Journal of Logic guarantees that anyone can access the work
immediately and freely. The AJL eliminates virtually all barriers—financial,
temporal, geographical, institutional—to this goal and we could not imagine
a more appropriate setting for this issue. Ed Mares’ suggestion that this
collection take the form of a special issue of this journal was a pivotal event
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in the preparation of this issue. We are grateful to him for providing this
venue and for entrusting us with stewardship of an issue.
The survival of the two monographs across half a century was possible
only for the stewardship of a number of individuals who allowed us access to
their copies. We owe thanks not only to Mike Dunn and Chris Mortensen—
whose copies made up the primary sources for the versions reproduced in
this issue—but for the help of countless others who took the time to compare
notes against their own copies.
Similarly, the three works reproduced in this issue provide critical con-
text for Arithmetic Formulated Relevantly and The Consistency of Arith-
metic. Their inclusion guarantees that this issue is coherent, self-contained,
and accessible, providing immeasurable value to readers; these enhancements
were won only through the assistance of a number parties. First, Chris
Mortensen’s permission to reproduce the two papers that he had coauthored
with Meyer was critical—which is not to say that any other of the many ways
in which this issue has benefited from his assistance were any less critical.
We thank him for his willingness to share his work with us, doubly so for
patiently answering queries that arose during typesetting.
Similar acknowledgments are due to the journals in which the previously
published works originally appeared. Permission to include the abstract “Rel-
evant Arithmetic” was kindly granted by Prof. Dr Hab. Andrzej Indrzejczak
(who also tracked down the LATEXfile used by the Bulletin of the Section of
Logic); we thank him—as well as  Lodz University Press—for these efforts.
Likewise, we are grateful to Prof. Richard Shore, the Association for
Symbolic Logic, and the Journal of Symbolic Logic for granting permission
to reprint “Inconsistent Models for Relevant Arithmetics” in this collection.
The copyright for the work is retained by the Association for Symbolic Logic.
It is not hyperbole to suggest that reading Meyer’s work is a treasure,
a sentiment that applies no less to the monographs published in this issue.
The quality of the content—in formal results, insights, and arguments—is
matched by Meyer’s writing, which is uniformly funny and engaging. As
potential companions to Meyer’s writing, the contributed research papers
faced exceptionally high expectations.
We recognize the challenge for contributed papers’ authors—to produce
work of a high caliber carries costs payable in many currencies—emotional,
mental, and temporal, among others. The reader will recognize that the
authors delivered work that can proudly stand side by side with Meyer’s
work. The authors’ willingness to pay this toll to support our efforts is
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acknowledged and appreciated.
Likewise, high demands made of authors, of course, give rise to high
demands of the researchers who agreed to referee the contributions. Many
anonymous referees were willing to share their time and expertise reviewing
these contributions; despite their anonymity, we are grateful to them for their
efforts, a sentiment that has been communicated to us by the authors as well.
Graham Priest would like it noted that all the hard editorial work of
turning Meyer’s texts into polished LATEXpieces—and in fact most of the
hard editorial work on the issue—was done by Thomas Ferguson.
One final, unfortunate note is necessary. As the last touches were being
put to this issue, we received the sad news of the death of Bob’s long-time
friend and co-worker in relevant logic, J. M. (Mike) Dunn. As we have indi-
cated, there are myriad ways in which Dunn’s help was critical in assembling
the present collection, which likely would not have been started without
Dunn’s early encouragement.
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